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Introduction
Much of prevailing industrial relations theory rests on the premise that
there exist different "national models" of industrial relations. This approach rests on
three distinct but interrelated assumptions : 1) that national borders are synonymous
with the scope of markets; 2) that national unions are necessary to cope with
challenges generated by national markets and the modern corporation; and 3) that
certain national institutional arrangements are more effective than others at
adapting to changing political-economic circumstances.1
Yet the new terms of international competition and technological innovation
have challenged each of these underlying conditions. Markets have become
simultaneously globalized and segmented while new technologies have provided
opportunities for individual firms and entire industries to experiment with
alternative business strategies and structures. 2 Together these developments test
and/or transcend the boundaries of traditional industrial relations practices.For
instance, while national industrial unions have proven unwilling, or perhaps unable,
to adjust to or even accomodate these changes, individual films have pursued a
variety of alternative arrangements with labor. This combination of micro-level
effervescence and macro-level paralysis has provoked a proliferation of diverse
patterns of industrial relations within and not simply across nations. Some of these
sub-national labor-management arrangements appear to have more in common with
their equivalents in other countries than with other industrial relations patterns co-
existing within the same national borders. In short, just as the creation of national
markets and the rise of the national union were central to the development of
national industrial relations systems theory, now the demise of these conditions
creates the need for new explanations.
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Through an analysis of recent changes in Italian industrial relations, this
paper makes a case for a new approach to comparative industrial relations research
and theory. Instead of treating national systems as the basic unit of analysis and
searching for macro-institutional features as the key dimensions to use in
constructing comparative typologies of industrial relations systems, the approach
developed here focuses on micro-level developments and the politics of strategic
choice to explain variation within nations. This approach builds on previous work in
industrial relations which employs strategic choice theory to explain managerial
behavior3 but extends this analysis to labor unions in order to identify the relevant
forces shaping their divergent responses to industrial change.
To illustrate this approach, this paper analyzes the reorganization of Italy's
two leading automobile producers -- Fiat Auto and Alfa Romeo. These cases are
interesting for a variety of reasons. First, both firms have historically played major
roles in Italy's economy and have often set the pattern of industrial relations
elsewhere in the country. The development of work relations and the balance of
power in these firms reveals (often in extreme form) 4 the situation elsewhere in the
country. Second, in many ways Fiat and Alfa have acted as advanced laboratories
for Italian industrial relations. Since the late 1960s these firms have witnessed
several experiments in both the organization of production and the strategy of the
union movement. Finally, union experiences with industrial adjustment at these two
firms have been radically different. While Fiat Auto reorganized by asserting
managerial control and repressing the unions, Alfa Romeo experienced a more
negotiated process. Moreover, whereas both firms emerged more competitive as a
result of the reorganization, the outcomes for the two unions differed sharply :
Alfa's unions managed to preserve, if not enhance their- strength while Fiat's unions
lost membership and practically all influence on the shop floor. This divergence is
especially interesting given that both firms share the same ownership, their
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workforces are organized by the same unions, their plants possess similar
technologies, and they operate within the same national setting.
This paper argues that two factors are key to explaining these different
outcomes : local socio-economic conditions which shape the strategies of unions
and management in firms undergoing adjustment; and the choices unions make in
reallocating responsibilities between local and national structures. The argument
will be laid out in three parts. The first part examines the rise and decline of the
national union in Italy. The second section illustrates this development at the
micro-level through an in-depth analysis of industrial restructuring in the Italian
automobile industry. The implications of this analysis for ~mparative industrial
relations theory and research are discussed in the conclusion.
The Rise and Fall of the National Union in Italy
National unions arose throughout the West in response to the emergence of
the modern corporation and the creation of national markets. 5 These national
industrial unions were characterized by two basic features : organizational
hierarchies in which vertical industry structures dominated local and regional union
bodies and national contracts standardized wages and working conditions
throughout the industry; and firm-level functionalism in which managerial authority
was respected and unions merely grieved or negotiated the impact of managerial
decisions.
These two basic features were mutually reinforcing. For example, in response
to the growth of national markets, national unions standardized wages and working
conditions across plants and industrial sectors. These practices, in turn, helped
sustain the consumer demand that created national markets based on mass
production of standardized goods. Similarly, as industrial production became
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centered around large firms employing semi-skilled workers to produce standardized
commodities according to a strict division of labor within the plant, national
industrial unions increasingly focused their organizational strategies around these
workers, often at the expense of other segments of the working class. Union
contracts also sought to regulate rather than transform the emergent division of
labor within plants.
The recent transformation of national markets and consequent proliferation
of diverse business practices not only across but also within the same industries
have undermined the organizational rationale for the supremacy of national
industrial unions. In fact, these vertical structures appear nable to adapt to the
variety of corporate structures and strategies emerging within their sectors. The
union's place within the firm is also changing. Functional distinctions between
different kinds of jobs or between labor and management more generally are
becoming blurred in firms where new technologies require broadly skilled workers
capable of performing a variety of jobs. 6 This transformation of work combined
with the increased participation of new types of workers (women, youth, part-time)
in the labor market has shrunk the traditional power base (emi-skilled male
workers) of most industrial unions. And even these traditional workers have become
disgruntled with national union structures which appear unable to represent, let
alone defend their interests. In short, both constituent elements of the postwar
industrial relations system -- the supremacy of national industrial unions and firm-
level functionalism -- have been swept away by the current wave of industrial
restructuring.
In Italy, this pattern is unfolding in slightly different ways due to the
peculiarities of Italy's postwar industrial relations system in which national
industrial unions developed somewhat later and as creatures of the national
confederations. The Italian labor movement emerged from the destruction of
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twenty years of fascism and the Second World War as a highly politicized,
centralized and unified organization, the Cofederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
(CGIL). The union movement, like Italy's first postwar governments, consisted of a
broad coalition of anti-fascist resistance forces : Communist, Socialist, Republican
and Catholic currents co-existed within the trade union confederation.
The union movement was the creation of these political parties. Because the
postwar labor movement had to rebuild more or less from scratch, union structures
at all levels were creations of the central confederations in Rome. Rank-and-file
workers and pre-fascist trade unionists had little to do with the reconstruction of
the Italian union movement. Indeed, many of the CGIL's initial union leaders were
recruited directly from political parties, often having little previous union
experience. 7
With the advent of the Cold War, both government and labor coalitions
dissolved. The Catholic current of the CGIL eventually established itself as the
Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) while the Republican and
Social-Democratic trade union leaders set-up the Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori
(UIL). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the politics and strategies of the three
union confederations were shaped by their political affiliations and rivalries. 8
Increased collaboration during the "hot autumn" led to a form of
reunification in 1972 with the signing of the Federative Pact. Within the
Federazione Unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL, each confederation retained its autonomy at
all levels of the union hierarchy but new joint structures aimed at coordinating
decisions among these existing organizations were also created. 9 The federation
dissolved in 1984, due to disagreements between the Communists in the CGIL and
the rest of the labor movement over an Italian Communist Party (PCI) sponsored
referendum abrogating a government decree revising the scala mobile (system of
wage indexation). Since then, the three confederations have continued to cooperate
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in contract negotiations notwithstanding increasing antagonism over issues like
flexible work hours, internal mobility and contingent compensation schemes.
Each confederation has both vertical and horizontal structures. The vertical
structures are based on industries or branches of industry. Thus, each
confederation has a national chemicalworkers, textileworkers, and metalworkers
federation. The three confederations are also organized geographically, in what are
called "horizontal" structures (e.g., the Camera del Lavoro of Turin or Milan).
During the 1950s, when the union movement was fragmented, weak and politically
isolated, these horizontal structures, especially the confederations, were
predominant. However, with the increase in collective bargaining at the industry and
firm levels during the 1960s, the national industrial unions became ascendant.1 0
Following the hot autumn struggles and the federative pact in 1972, factory
councils, elected by and composed of union and non-union workers alike, were
established at the shop floor. These are the official workplace organs of the three
confederations, replacing the earlier Commisione Interne (factory grievance
commitees). Figure 1 depicts the organization of the Italian union movement.
Because of their role in negotiating the contratti collettivi nazionali di
lavoro (CCNLs), triennial industry-wide collective bargaining agreements over
minimum wages, work hours, and job classification schemes, the national industry
unions remained extremely powerful throughout the 1970s, notwithstanding other
(not necessarily coordinated) accords being negotiated at the confederal and plant
levels.1 1 Among these industry federations, the metalworkers unions -- the FIOM,
FIM, and UILM, 12 associated respectively with the CGIL, CISL and UIL -- were
traditionally Italy's largest and most powerful national unions. The metalworkers
often served as strategic and political innovators for the rest of the union
movement, leading the way for the other industrial federations and even for the
three national confederations. 13 For example, it was the metalworkers who
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instigated the resurgence of working class militancy and promoted renewed unity
among the three competing confederations in the 1960s. The metalworkers also
spearheaded most innovations in collective bargaining, often setting the pattern to
be replicated by national unions in other industrial sectors. Their leadership role
was so pronounced that the most assured way of climbing the union hierarchy was
within the metalworkers unions -- almost all confederal secretaries came from these
national industrial unions.
However, this leadership role has been seriously challenged by the massive
industrial restructuring which took place i Italy throughout the 1980s.1 4 As
individual firms and even entire industries reorganized their plants, invested in new
technologies, and reduced their workforces, national industrial unions like the
metalworkers found themselves suddenly outflanked. With each firm embarking on a
different adjustment strategy, it became increasingly difficult for the national
unions to negotiate, let alone coordinate their responses to, the reorganization
underway in the industry. Attempts to do so through various Industry Plans failed
miserably.
Even the triennial industry-wide collective bargaining negotiations (CCNLs),
the institutional basis of the metalworkers' power, began to elude their control as
individual employers and local unions resisted national accords which continued to
standardize working conditions, work hours, and job classifications throughout the
industry. These micro-level actors argued that national industry-wide contracts were
overly rigid and unresponsive to their particular needs. As a result, both the
sequencing and the content of these industry agreements began to change in ways
that further eroded the leadership role of the national industrial unions.
For example, master agreements (CCNLs) used to be negotiated every three
years and renewals were essentially automatic. Negotiations by union locals at
individual firms were mere addenda to these more standardized national contracts
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and usually took place within one year of the signing of the national agreements.
During the 1980s this pattern completely broke down. Examination of the
metalworkers contracts indicates that time lags between the expiration and
renegotiation of national contracts as well as between the signing of national
accords and their integration at the firm-level have increased substantially (See
tables and 2). While we must be careful not to overinterpret these developments,
it seems safe to infer that these trends suggest that the national metalworkers
union experiences substantial difficulties in developing, let alone implementing
contracts capable of covering the wide array of experiences prevalent within the
same industry.
The content of collective bargaining agreements also appears to be shifting
in favor of local unions. Recent research on collective bargaining in Italy reveals
that contrary to past practice, local union contracts appear to be the most
innovative and important agreements covering workers in industry. 1 5 At both Fiat
and Alfa, in fact, negotiations over work-time, work rythms, bonuses and profit
sharing, new technologies and redundancies all appear to be negotiated at the firm
level.16 Even the sequencing of contract negotiations has shifted in favor of local
unions. Whereas before, national contracts were negotiated first and local
agreements later, often with a prescribed lag period, today many local unions
negotiate their own contracts first, with the national agreement emerging later more
as an aggregation and ratification of prior local deals. 17
To better appreciate how this process occured, the next section of this
paper will analyze the reorganization of Italy's two leading automobile
manufacturers -- Fiat Auto and Alfa Romeo. The discussion will proceed in two
stages. First it will describe the restructuring processes of each firm. Then, it will
compare the divergent outcomes of the two companies and analyze them according
to the alternative approach outlined above.
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Industrial Adjustment and Industrial Relations: A Tale of Two Comanies
Chronic Conflictualism : The Case of Fiat Auto
Fiat was founded in 1899. After a few years, Fiat's founder and chairman,
Giovanni Agnelli, began to pursue a strategy aimed at the transformation of
automobile production into large-scale industry. This change in strategy was the
result of Agnelli's visit to the United States and his decision to "produce like
Henry Ford." 1 8 This plan by Agnelli to develop large-scale industry in Turin made
Fiat not only a major actor in the local economy but also the main architect of
Fordism in Italy. Fiat, like Ford, began to pay higher wages as a way of attracting
skilled workers away from other firms-. After the recession of 1907, it took over
several of its suppliers as well as its competitors. As a result, Fiat managed to
simultaneously increase its productive integration and reduce local competition.
Factory work also began to change. Production was organized by sequence
and American semi-automatic single-purpose machine tools were introduced.
Interestingly enough, the metalworkers' union, FIOM, not only agreed to these
changes (in return for increased piece rates) but also reorganized its structures to
match the emergent fordist order.1 9
While two world wars and the autarkic economic policies of the Fascist
regime delayed the realization of Agnelli's plans for about forty years, by the late
1950s Fiat had succeeded in creating and servicing a mass market for automobiles in
Italy. By the late 1960s Fiat had one of the largest automobile production facilities
in Western Europe from which it dominated the Italian market and exported abroad.
In short, over the course of the post-war period, Fiat became Italy's leading
automobile producer and largest private enterprise.
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By the late 1970s, however, Fiat Auto, like most automobile producers in
Western Europe and the United States, experienced very serious organizational and
financial problems. In many ways, Fiat's troubles were related to the more general
crisis of the auto industry. A variety of factors, including increased international
competition, the rise of fuel costs, changing consumer tastes, more stringent
government health, safety and environmental protection regulations, and increased
labor costs all contributed to the crisis of the automobile industry in the West.2 0
Yet, because of insufficient capital investments and extremely conflictual and rigid
industrial relations practices throughout the 1970s, Fiat's productivity, profitability,
and plant utilization rates were all lower than its major competitors.
Fiat's crisis became visible when the automobile division acquired a separate
balance sheet for the first time in 1979. Suddenly, Italy's largest privately owned
firm appeared to be on the verge of bankruptcy. As a result, the firm launched a
restructuring process which included the massive introduction of new process and
product technologies, a reorganization of its supplier and sales networks, and a
radical break with the industrial relations practices of the 1970s.21 As part of its
reorganization plan, Fiat proposed to place 24,000 workers in cassa integrazione a
state-financed redundancy fund, during the Fall of 1980.
The local union rejected this reorganization plan and broke off relations
with the firm. Fiat, in turn, declared its intention to fire 15,000 workers,
beginning on October 6. Things heated up as the union blockaded the firm and
Fiat sent out letters of dismissal. The ensuing strike lasted 35 days but rank-
and-file participation was low. Finally, on October 14, Fiat foremen and
supervisors organized a successful demonstration calling for a return to work.
40,000 people marched against the union, among them many blue collar workers. 2 2
That very night an agreement was signed which represented a major defeat for the
union. The agreement met with resistance from the more militant factions of the
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local union but was signed and pushed through for approval by the national
industry federations. Despite initial attempts by the local labor movement to claim
victory in this strike, it marked a major defeat from which the unions never
recovered 23
With the union out of the way, Fiat embarked on a major reorganization of
its production processes. Its products were re-designed so that many new models
with greater differentiation in appearance but more common components were
introduced. The modular design of these new models permitted the automaker to
reap greater economies of scale as well. Fiat also invested heavily in new
technologies like CADs, CAMs and industrial robots. Finally, Fiat rationalized and
upgraded its network of components suppliers. This increased collaboration
between Fiat and its suppliers both enhanced the quality of its components and
stimulated continuous product innovation.
The consequences of this reorganization have been positive for the firm.
Profits rose from 324 billion lire in 1981 to 1764 billions in 1988.24 Productivity, as
measured by the average number of cars produced by single worker, more than
doubled (from 14.0 to 29.0) between 1979 and 1986. As a result of these and other
improvements, Fiat has increased its market share and now rivals Volkswagen as
Etrrope's number one auto producer.
If the results of Fiat's restructuring have been positive for the auto firm,
the consequences for the union have not. Immediately following the rupture in
relations with the unions in 1980, the firm asserted a "hard" line with the labor
movement. Within the factories this translated into a recreation of traditional
hierarchies and control on the shop floor, the expulsion of numerous union
activists, and the reduction of the workforce by tens of thousands of workers. 25
Ongoing antagonism between the local unions and Fiat management
foreclosed all possibilities of labor participation in the adjustment processes
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underway. In many shops, traditional union rules and practices were rendered
obsolete by the introduction of new technologies and the reorganization of
production. Three examples concerning informal accords over piece rates and
pauses, job classification schemes, and sourcing decisions illustrate this point.
During the 1970s, factory delegates and the Job Analysis offices of Fiat's plants
engaged in extremely meticulous, time consuming negotiations over individual and
group work effort levels (livelli di saturazione), piece rates and new piecework
times, and working conditions. 26 As a result, numerous informal accords were
reached regulating piece rates and breaks in different parts of the assembly line
and hazardous work sites (i.e., paint shops) were restructured. However, with the
introduction of new technologies in chassis welding (Robogate), engine construction
(LAM), and the paint shops (robots), work was reorganized in a variety of different
shops and these previous accords were rendered obsolete, if not entirely
unnecessary.
These new technologies also transcended traditional job classification
schemes as they simultaneously rendered certain traditional jobs redundant while
also creating new positions for people capable of both operating and servicing
these new process technologies (e.g., meccatronico). Since the skill requirements
and responsibilities for these new jobs did not fit nicely into traditional job
classification schemes, and as increasing numbers of workers began to occupy these
new jobs, the unions found themselves with an anachronistic classification system.
What to do with these workers placed the unions in a difficult position. Either way
they would lose since they would either antagonize new workers by not fully
appreciating their skills, or anger their traditional constituency of semi-skilled
workers by appearing to favor the new workers with the extra bonuses and
privileges associated with higher classification levels.
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Finally, the reconceptualization of the automobile as a composite of modular
macro-component systems overhauled prior production and sourcing arrangements as
engines, brake systems, dashboards and seats could be produced by specialized
suppliers working in collaboration with Fiat. Since these "make or buy" decisions
seemed to be continuously renegotiated by the firm and given that many of these
suppliers were also organized by the metalworkers union, it became increasingly
difficult for the union to develop a viable position on these issues.
Perhaps more damaging for union practices than the actual changes in
production, was the way these changes were implemented by the firm. For the first
half of the decade, Fiat management circumvented the unions, negotiating directly
with workers over issues concerning retraining, flexible work hours, and
modifications of their jobs. While these modifications were significant enough to
match the changes underway in the organization of production they were not so
dramatic as to necessitate formal renegotiations of job classification schemes, etc.
since this would have legally required union participation. This blurring or bending
but not breaking of already established contractual rules and boundaries was very
characteristic of Fiat industrial relations policies over the course of the 1980s.
A recent study on the way Fiat workers perceive the technological changes
underway in the firm suggests that those workers most vulnerable to being
replaced by automation are extremely anxious about their positions and diffident
towards the union. Unions are shunned not only because of their failure to protect
these workers but also because of fears that union contacts will result in company
reprisals in the form of dismissals or cassa inteqrazione2 7. Union membership rates
reflect these feelings. At Fiat's various Turinese plants, membership in the local
metalworkers union, the FLM, fell from. 32,898 in 1980 to 11,589 in 1986.28
If the-situation is precarious for workers within the firm, it was even more
dismal for those workers expelled from the factories. The most evident sign of the
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severe dislocation resulting from Fiat's restructuring and the defeat of the union
was the existence and fate of the "cassintearati", i.e., the redundant workers
supported by this special fund. Fiat alone placed 31,000 full-time workers in cassa
integrazione while also employing this mechanism to lay-off other workers during
periodic downward shifts in demand. During the first half of the 1980s, tens of
thousands of local workers found themselves under- or unemployed, though the
exact number of people placed in cassa intearazione by Fiat and related firms is
difficult to determine precisely as figures are calculated in terms of hours, not
individuals.
The majority of cassintegrati were middle-aged, unskilled, poorly educated
workers of Southern origin. Many of the handicapped and women workers hired
during the latter half of the 1970s (because of union enforcement of national
hiring policies) were also removed from the factory during these years. Many
cassintegrati experienced tremendous difficulties adjusting to their new lives
outside the factory. With the loss of their jobs, their identities -- very much
associated with the workplace, work group, and productive activity -- were thrown
into question. Removed from the shop floor, these workers also lost their political
affiliations and social relations. Workers in cassa integrazione found themselves in a
state of limbo : no longer active in the factory but still legally dependent on the
firm for survival. The costs of this exclusion are high. Among these workers, rates
of suicide, divorce, substance abuse, and psychological illness have reached alarming
proportions 2 9 .
Needless to say, serious tensions have developed between this group and the
unions which are held responsible for their sad state. Loss of support among the
rank-and-file has been matched by other problems, including continued strategic
confusion, factional in-fighting and purges, and persistent paralysis vis-a'-vis firm
initiatives. In sum, the local union's policy of militant confrontation and
15
intransigence in the face of the firm's need to restructure not only failed but also
threatens to destroy the union. A more careful examination of why the union
adopted this strategy raises serious questions about union politics in today's
climate of sweeping economic change. But before this is attempted, let us look at a
second, very different case of industrial restructuring. Examination of this second
case will not only provide us with a comparative perspective through which to
better understand the case of Fiat but also highlight the local socio-economic
factors which shape labor politics.
Negotiated Restructuring : The Case of Alfa Romeo
Founded in 1906, Alfa Romeo did not concentrate its production on
automobiles until after World War 11.3 0 Instead, alongside its automobile production
it also manufactured a variety of more or less profitable items like munitions,
railroad stock and aircraft engines. Following the First World War, market limits,
financial problems and management errors constrained Alfa Romeo's car output. This
occurred during the same period in which Fiat began to reorganize its production
along the lines of mass production. In contrast, Alfa management drew on the firm's
experience in making racing cars and concentrated on the manufacture of high
quality and expensive automobiles. In the field of industrial relations, the firm
stressed workers' skills, cooperation and loyalty to the firm. Even after the
company's take-over by the state during the Depression, Alfa continued to be
characterized by this model of industrial development.
This triad of high quality production, skilled workers and cooperative
industrial relations continued to underpin the firm's industrial strategy in the
postwar period. In fact, Alfa did not really embark on the mass production of
autos until the early 1960s, when it opened its Arese plant outside Milan and
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doubled its productive capacity. Even then, it continued its tradition of high
quality production through technical innovation (Alfa was famous for its technically
advanced product development and design.) and labor-management cooperation. The
results were impressive : over the course of the decade Alfa tripled its sales,
doubled its workforce and became an internationally recognized leader in sportscars.
The success of this model, however, was fully appreciated only after it was
abandoned for Fordism. In 1972, Alfa Romeo opened its Pomigliano plant outside of
Naples and thus sought to break from its past and embark on a new path of
development. With the Pomigliano plant, Alfa sought to change its traditional
product differentiation-based strategy and instead manufacture a new product, the
Alfasud, which was a small, economy car, for a mass market (which the firm knew
little about since its traditional products are extremely expensive and cater to a
small niche of clients), in a new way (using unskilled workers and highly
automated and dedicated equipment).31 That the firm sought to change its strategy
exactly at the moment when the European automobile industry began to suffer from
overcapacity, increased fuel and labor costs, and greater international competition,
may explain the disastrous results this change in strategy had for the firm. That
these two productive poles were operated more or less as two distinct companies,
with seperate managements and autonomous design, purchasing and marketing
offices, may also account for the poor results experienced by Alfa during the 1970s.
In fact, following the opening of Pomigliano, Alfa never again turned a profit and
what was once seen as the pride and joy of Italian state enterprise languished for
over a decade before it was finally restructured.
To further exacerbate the firm's troubles, labor relations at Alfa (both in
the North and the South) became extremely conflictual in the 1970s. Like Fiat,
Alfa Romeo experienced an especially militant wave of strikes and worker
mobilization during the hot autumn. While instigated and for the most part
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controlled by older union militants, here too Southern migrant workers were active
in the strikes.3 2 In fact, unions at Alfa became so powerful that they were often
able to achieve their goals with no more than the threat of strikes. While
absenteeism and hours lost to work stoppages increased dramatically over the
decade, productivity and product quality plummeted. 33 The climate of industrial
relations at the Pomigliano plant became so horrible that industrial sociologists
dedicate volumes to understand this case of "anomolous conflictuality". 3 4
Yet, the way Alfa sought to deal with its troubles was radically different
from Fiat. For example, in the early 1980s, the local union and Alfa's management
negotiated a series of accords aimed at both increasing the firm's productivity and
enriching workers' skills. Out of these agreements emerged the homogenous
production groups (GPO), teams of 10-20 laborers working on different segments of
the production line. Essentially, the assembly line was divided into various
segments with groups of workers assigned to these segments. Within these groups,
workers rotated various jobs as a way of eliminating monotony and increasing their
skills. Quality control and maintenance work were also relegated to these groups. As
a result of these changes, productivity increased 35% within a year, product quality
improved and a number of indirect and supervisory jobs were eliminated from the
factory.3 5 The success of this experiment appeared so great that one of Aifa's
personnel managers wrote a book arguing that one could "forget Turin"
("dimenticare Torino") in this new phase of "negotiated restructuring".36 In fact,
both absenteeism and strikes decreased significantly following these accords (See
Table 3).
While a variety of factors including the increased militancy of the local
FIM and the subsequent dissolution of union unity at Alfa, the break-down of the
firm's logistic system (making it nearly impossible to maintain production schedules,
let alone product quality), a series of management turn-overs, and persistent under-
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investment, especially in new product and process technologies, all combined to
undermine the production group experience,3 7 the more cooperative spirit of Alfa's
labor-management relations continues, even now that Alfa belongs to Fiat and is run
by Fiat managers.
Illustrative of this continuity is the May 3, 1987 agreement between Fiat
and the unions over the restructuring of Alfa Romeo. In this accord, Fiat agreed
to increase production by investing 55 billion lire in new process technologies, re-
styling a number of existing Alfa models and transferring production of various
Lancia models (Y-10 and Thema) to Alfa's plants. In return for these investments,
the union abandoned what remained of the production groups, agreed to a number
of early retirements and the use of cassa inteirazione and relaxed its norms
regulating internal labor mobility. In essence, the unions traded labor flexibility in
return for job security for the vast majority of Alfa's workforce.
Interestingly enough, the radical faction of the local FIM rejected this
restructuring plan and mobilized the local workforce against it. Claiming that the
national metalworkers union and the local FIOM and UILM had sold out to Fiat,
this faction demanded a referendum on the restructuring plan. This took place in
the late Spring of 1987, with a victory for the more cooperative forces. Moreover,
with the unions involved, the costs of the reorganization in terms of cassa
integrazione or union membership were much lower than anticipated. While the plan
envisioned the continued use of this instrument through 199(), most workers placed
in cassa intearazione were back at their jobs by 1989. And while all unions suffered
a slight reduction in membership following the accord with Fiat (much of it due to
early retirements), the more cooperative unions fared much better than the militant
FIM. (See Table 4) With the success of the 164 model, Alfa has once again become
profitable and is regaining market share in both Italy and abroad.
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Alternative Explanations for Diversity in Industrial Relatio_n_ s
Thus, we have two cases, one of chronic conflictualism resulting in the
efeat of the union and the other of a more negotiated solution which appears to
have benefitted both labor and management. How do we account for these
differences in union experiences with industrial restructuring? One's first instinct is
to attribute these differences to economic factors. In other words, because these
two firms occupy different market segments, they faced different challenges and
thus the processes and outcomes of their respective reorganizations diverged. While
it is true that Alfa and Fiat have traditionally pursued different strategies, it is
also true that during the 1970s (with Fiat's acquisition of Lancia and Alfa's
construction of Pomigliano) their strategies and product ranges began to converge. 3 8
If anything, Alfa's financial difficulties were much more serious than Fiat's.
Moreover, other foreign companies competing with Fiat in exactly the same market
segments appear to have restructured in vastly different ways. 3 9 Thus, competitive
strategy alone can not explain the observed differences.
Another explanation commonly offered to account for the divergent patterns
of industrial relations at these two firms focuses on the fact that Alfa (until 1986)
was a state-owned firm and thus, its management could be more relaxed about
economic goals like efficiency and sales, permitting it to be "easier" on the unions.
However, a recent study reviewing management practices at Alfa during these years
indicates that Alfa's management was no more benevolent towards the unions than
Fiat's management and at times, it was even more aggressive.4 0 That labor relations
at Alfa continue to be significantly different from those at Fiat, even now that
they share the same ownership and management, also casts doubt on this assertion.
An alternative way of explaining the diversity of union experiences with
corporate restructuring employed in this paper focuses on two basic features : local
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socio-economic factors which shape union behavior at the firm level and the
institutional linkages between local and national union structures. Building on the
works of Arnaldo Bagnasco, Carlo Trigilia, and Mark Granovetter41 which illustrate
how local socio-political arrangements and resources influence the strategic choices
of economic actors like firms and unions, I argue that three local features shape
the type of strategies developed by local unions : 1) the organizational strength of
the local union; 2) the ideological outlook or worldview of its leadership, and 3) the
degree of social and political development of the surrounding context.
Moreover, because industrial development occured in different ways and at
different times in the various localities and regions of all national economies,
certain organizational attributes tend to cluster together, reflecting the particular
context in which they are embedded. At Alfa, for example, the local union is
organizationally strong in terms of its resources and legitimacy, its leadership seeks
to negotiate rather than resist the changes underway in the industry, and both the
union and the firm are integrated into a complex social network capable of
mediating conflicts between them. At Fiat, on the other hand, the union is
organizationally weak, its leadership is extremely militant, and there are no strong
and autonomous interest groups or political parties in Turin capable of arbitrating
labor-management conflicts.42
But the story of Italian industrial relations in the 1980s is not simply a
collection of local histories. In fact, to fully understand how diverse models of
local industrial politics have proliferated over this decade, we must also examine the
institutional linkages between local and national union structures. What we observe
is that the ability (or lackthereof) of particular national unions to articulate a new
division of labor within their organizations, one which provides local unions with
increased autonomy over their firm-level strategies while at the same time
preserving for themselves a minimum degree of control and coordination over basic
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issues like wages and working conditions, also influences union experiences with
industrial change. A re-examination of our two cases illustrates the importance of
these two sets of factors in shaping contemporary industrial relations patterns in
Italy.
The Cases Revisited : Local Patterns of Industrial Relations
The development of Fiat along the lines of Fordism, and the way in which it
occured, had significant effects on both the firm and its workforce, as well as on
the history of Turin.4 3 The expansive development of the firm made it not only
the biggest, but in many ways the only show in town. Fiat is referred to as "la
mamma" by local residents. The local economy has historically revolved around the
firm and the majority of the local labor force is employed either at Fiat or at one
of its numerous suppliers.
Due to its hegemonic position, Fiat was able to dominate local government,
control local business and cultural associations, and thus, more or less determine
the development of the city. Fiat management also cultivated an extremely
authoritarian, hierarchical vision of its role.4 4 Thus, during the early years of the
firm, through the long tenure of Vittorio Valletta, and continuing to this day, Fiat
management has sought to control the firm's development unilaterally. As a result,
management promoted pro-business political forces and company unions. It also
sought to tame its workforce through a combination of repression and paternalism
and undermined all attempts at alternative bases of power (i.e., the postwar co-
management councils, consiali di aestione) within its plants.
This particular model of development had a major impact on the local labor
movement. 45 Local unions were esseantially weak organizations with strong
ideologies. Antagonism towards the firm combined with a maximalist vision of
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politics to create a local labor movement which perceived itself (and at times
sought to act) as the vanguard of the Italian labor movement. 4 6 For instance,
peculiar to the local labor movement are its frequent experiences with spontaneous
worker upsurges, regularly followed by the politicization of industrial relations. This
occurred in 1913, when the rank-and-file supported anarcho-syndicalist positions and
prevented the local union from negotiating with the firm, and have continued
throughout the local union's history.
As a result of the particular way in which industry developed in Turin and
the peculiarities of the local labor movement, stable relations between the firm and
its workforce never developed. The result was a continuous struggle between these
actors in which no long-lasting compromises were possible. Defeat by one meant its
almost complete subordination to the other. The wounds of past battles were
nourished as the loser prepared revenge in the next round of struggles. Thus, since
the factory occupations in 1920, and continuing through the rise and fall of fascism,
the restoration of private capital in the 1950s, the hot autumn struggles in the late
1960s, and the 35-day strike in 1980, labor and management in Turin have been
engaged in an all or nothing battle.
Furthermore, Turin does not possess the socio-political resources necessary
to mediate the type of conflictual labor relations characteristic of Fiat. Because of
the simplicity of Turinese society -- composed essentially of two groups : an
industrial bourgeoisie and a proletarian working class -- organized interest groups
and political parties never fully developed in Turin. Membership figures and
participation rates in these political institutions are especially low in Turin.47 Even
in the union, which has historically been more of a movement than an institution,
membership rates have been always below the national average. What other interest
groups exist are dominated by either the firm or the union movement. The only
institutions that are autonomous of these two protagonists are the local churches.
23
III
But due to their own historical development even they are quite radical and actually
exacerbate rather than diminish antagonisms between labor and management at
Fiat.4 8 In sum, the local union at Fiat was a highly political but organizationally
weak structure located in a city lacking potential mediators of industrial conflict. It
is no suprise, therefore, that repeated attempts by groups within the local union
and firm to construct a more negotiated and stable form of industrial relations at
Fiat failed.4 9
The contrast with Alfa is striking. As we have seen, Alfa developed in such
a way that preserved workers' skills and reinforced local union organizations
through much of this century. Unlike at Fiat, the union at Alfa was never
seriously repressed during the postwar period. Thus, throughout the 1950s and
1960s, as well as after the hot autumn, the union at Alfa consisted of a sizeable
group of disciplined old-guard unionists who promoted shop floor bargaining. This
group was active in all debates over union politics and played a major role in the
negotiated restructuring of the firm in the 1980s.
The local union was always a stronger and more complex organization than
its equivalent at Fiat and thus, less subject to the vicissitudes of the more
movement-oriented union in Turin. 50 Moreover, the auto industry is only one of
many industries in the area and while Alfa is the largest factory in Milan, the
metalworkers are not hegemonic in the same way they are in Turin. 5 1 Textile and
chemical unions -- two unions with much experience in technological innovation
and firm restructuring -- are also strong in Milan and thus counterbalanced the
particular interests or strategies of the more militant wings of the local
metalworkers' unions. Unlike Turin, Milan possesses strong and well organized
interest groups and political parties which have served historically as mediators
between labor and management and thus have helped avoid the development of the
zero-sum scenario which exists between labor and management at Fiat.
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Thus, local socio-economic factors shaped the divergent models of union
politics we examined. But this alone can not explain the different outcomes
observed, especially since the resurgence of local patterns of industrial politics has
also redrawn the boundaries between local and national unions. To fully understand
the different outcomes at Fiat and Alfa we must also examine the changing
relations between the national metalworkers union and the two locals in question.
What we find is that while the metalworkers' federation was unable to develop a
new, mutually agreeable division of labor between it and the locals at the time of
the Fiat restructuring, seven years later, and partially as a result of what it had
learned from the Fiat experince, a redistribution of responsibilities had been
achieved and the two levels of the union hierarchy could work together during the
reorganization of Alfa.
In the late 1970s, the two levels of the union competed with one another for
the strategic leadership of the union, often at the expense of its membership. The
debacle at Fiat in 1980 best illustrates the negative consequences of this internal
union struggle. For instance, prior to the 35 day strike at Fiat, the national
leadership of the metalworkers union sought to negotiate the reorganization of Fiat
with the firm's management. Unwilling to include the local union leadership (for
fear that it was too radical) national union leaders began these negotiations in
secret. When these meetings were discovered, the local union, unwilling to relegate
the power to negotiate the new firm-level contract to the national leadership,
rebelled against these negotiations and insisted that a new platform, including more
radical language and various non-negotiable demands, be presented instead. Unable
to impose its will on the local (We must recall that we are dealing with the largest
firm in Italy.) the national union acquiesced and negotiations subsequently broke
down.5 2 Thus, because of internal rivalries between the different levels of the
metalworkers' union, and given that a clear division of labor was not established
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between the local and the national over bargaining procedures and issues,
contractual negotiations were blocked. The 35 day strike and the eventual demise
of the local union soon followed.
The situation at Alfa was different. Notwithstanding the existence of a very
strong and militant group within the local FIM which opposed the accord with Fiat
over the restructuring of the company, the local FIOM, UILM and FLM, along with
the regional CGIL, CISL, and UIL all supported the agreement. Not only did these
other union groups outnumber the opposition but more importantly, the national
union, having learned from its prior mistakes, organized a referendum over the
accord in order to rally rank-and-file support for the restructuring plan. It
eventually even censored Tiboni, the leader of the FIM opposition for his
continuing agitations against the agreement. In short, seven years later, the
national union had learned how to work with reform-oriented groups within the
local union to prevent the type of showdown which had occured in Turin.
Industrial Relations Theory in a Changing International Economy
This paper has argued that the current wave of industrial restructuring in
Italy has provoked a reconfiguration of industrial relations in favor of local unions
which, because of their diverse organizational histories and socio-political contexts,
respond differently to common challenges. This explanation runs counter to the
dominant paradigm in comparative industrial relations theory which focuses on
national models of industrial relations and assumes a certain degree of homogeneity
within national systems. Diversity in industrial relations patterns, according to this
traditional approach, exists either between nations, due to their varying institutional
arrangements, or across sectors with different markets and technologies. The cases
of Fiat Auto and Alfa Romeo illustrated two very different patterns of industrial
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relations notwithstanding that both firms share the same ownership, their
workforces are organized by the same unions, their plants produce similar products
with analogous technologies, and they operate within the same national setting. To
explain these differences, I argued that clusters of local socio-economic variables
and the type of relations which existed between local and national union structures
combined to shape the strategies of unions and management in firms undergoing
industrial adjustment.
But this is not merely an Italian phenomenon nor is it limited to industrial
relations systems historically characterized by weaker linkages between the various
levels of the union.5 3 While local patterns of industrial politics may be especially
salient in Italy because of its peculiar political-economic development 5 4 , they
nonetheless appear to be emerging (perhaps in different ways) in other countries
with very different political-economic histories as well. In other words, what is
happening in Italy is not exceptional but rather reflective of more general trends
sweeping across all advanced industrial nations. 55 Recent work by Kern and Sabel
for Germany, Ahlen and Elvander for Sweden, and Kochan, Katz and McKersie for
the United States all suggest that similar patterns of decentralization and
redefinition of industrial relations practices are taking place in these countries as
well. 56
Nor is this process limited to industrial relations. In a variety of other
social science fields, new work stressing the decreasing salience of national models
is emerging. In political science, for example, discussions of "neo-corporatism" and
consociationalism have evolved away from country-based explanations to more
sectoral or regionally differentiated accounts. 57 The same is true for analyses of
corporate strategy and industrial organization.5 8
New research in comparative industrial relations needs to investigate the
determinants underlying these diverse sub-national patterns. In the same way that
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this paper sought to identify the key variables shaping the two patterns of
industrial relations observed in Italy, we could begin comparing seemingly analogous
sub-national models across nations in order to better grasp the political factors
shaping the strategic choices implicit within each one. Once we better understand
the determinants and consequnces of each of these micro-level patterns, we can
begin to analyze the different mixes or distributions of these sub-national models
across nations. Only if one or a particular set of models emerges as dominant in a
given country should we return to the convention of comparing industrial relations
systems in terms of national models. If this happens, we will be on our way towards
reconstructing national models which highlight rather than obscure the dynamic
relationship which exists between local practices and national regulatory institutions.
If not, we must construct completely new typologies, based perhaps on more local
or micro-level patterns of industrial relations, to guide future comparative research
and theorizing.
The proliferation of sub-national patterns of labor management relations is
an important issue not only for industrial relations theory. It is also central to
future union policy, especially at a time when the unity of the labor movement
could determine its future viability. In other words, the reconfiguration of
industrial relations in favor of the local or firm level not only creates
opportunities for unions to become more responsive to local needs but also poses
several risks for the labor movement as a whole. How does the labor movement
prevent whipsawing or the exploitation of workers in firms with weaker local
unions? How do unions (with or without allied political parties) reaggregate the
increasingly divergent interests of their rank and file (and of the majority of
workers who do not belong to unions) into an organizationally coherent labor
movement capable of promoting social and political reforms at the national level?
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Maintaining unity amid the increasing diversity of the labor movement will
not be easy. While some unions appear to be able to achieve this balance, others
have failed. As the Italian metalworkers' case illustrates, maintaining traditional
structures and strategies in the face of radical economic change simply does not
work. Times have changed and unions must change accordingly.
The transformation of the union away from its previous vertical, highly
bureaucratic structures and toward a more horizontal, perhaps more democratic,
organization has begun to take shape, but only after much internal debate
and several set-backs. Perhaps it is safe to say that it took the defeat at Fiat for
the metalworkers to respond differently at Alfa.
The reconstruction of the labor movement along more horizontal lines -- as
a federation of strong locals firmly embedded in their regional economies -- may be
a viable solution for the entire labor movement. Just as the national union was the
appropriate organizational solution in the previous era of national markets and
large, bureaucratic corporations, the federation of strong locals could be most adept
at representing the interests of workers in this period of market fragmentation and
continuous industrial change. Whether this alternative arrangment is possible, and if
so, whether it is sufficient to save organized labor, can not be answered at present.
These question are the focus of future research. Nonetheless, if this essay has been
at all convincing, it will have stimulated you to think that this alternative line of
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organizational legacy of past struggles between industrial relations actors.
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unemployment rates and more stable economic growth of these countries.
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